International History: The United Nations (SBQ) THE UNITED NATIONS s Worsening Cold War relations s Détente - PDF

THE UNITED NATIONS Conflicts 1. Arab-Israeli Conflicts o First Arab-Israeli War (1948) o Suez Crisis (1956) o Six-Day War (1967) o Yom Kippur War (1973) o Lebanon (1978 and 1982) 2. Congo Crisis ( )

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THE UNITED NATIONS Conflicts 1. Arab-Israeli Conflicts o First Arab-Israeli War (1948) o Suez Crisis (1956) o Six-Day War (1967) o Yom Kippur War (1973) o Lebanon (1978 and 1982) 2. Congo Crisis ( ) 3. Vietnamese-Cambodian War (1979) 4. UN and The Cold War o Korean War (1950) o Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961) o Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) o Vietnam War ( ) o Iran-Iraq (1980) o Afghanistan ( ) o Nicaragua (1989) o El Salvador ( ) 5. UN And The End Of The Cold War o Gulf War ( ) 6. Peacekeeping In Africa In The 1990s o Somalia (1991) o Rwandan (1994) o Bosnia (1992) Time Periods s Worsening Cold War relations s Détente o Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) o Yom Kippur War (1973) s Second Cold War 4. End of Cold War o Cambodia success o Somalia failure o Bosnia failure UN SECRETARY-GENERALS 1) TRYGVE LIE ( , Norwegian) Started his term before the Cold War period. Kept a high political profile and annoyed both the USSR and USA. Key Events Involvement in the Korean War, his role in seeking recognition for the PRC and his willingness to allow the USA to screen and dismiss disloyal Americans (i.e. with communist tendencies) in the UN Secretariat Eventually resigned and did not run for 2 nd term due to Soviet opposition and loss of support Evaluation/Limitations: Played a more active political role due to the paralysis of the UN caused by the Cold War. However, SG s ability to take effective action was curbed and hampered by superpower interests. icedvovos Page 1 1/12/12 2) DAG HAMMARSKJOLD ( , Danish) Architect of the concept of combined private and public multilateral diplomacy, using quiet diplomacy to negotiate with governments. This resulted in many successes, particularly his securing the release of 17 US airmen from China and the establishment of UNEF in response to the Suez Crisis. Was also convinced the UN should concentrate on preventive rather than corrective action in international security, and came up with the fundamental concept of preventive diplomacy in peacekeeping Key Events Strengthened UN position in Jordan-Lebanon crisis despite SC inability to come up with a resolution (was prepared to face any consequences ) Took initiatives of his own, e.g. in playing a major role in resolving a border dispute between Laos and Thailand without official authorization from SC or GA (but neither disapproved) Invoked Article 99 which authorized him to raise the issue of the Congo crisis to the SC Fell out with the USSR over the Congo crisis Evaluation Enhanced the prestige of the office by using quiet diplomacy to resolve various conflicts. 3) U THANT ( , Burmese) 1 st SG from a Third World country, giving him an advantage in dealing with colonialism issues Continued Hammarskjold s quiet diplomacy but acted with circumspection after the USSR s strong reaction to Hammarskjold s boldness Key Events Dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West Irian Jaya 1962 civil conflict in Yemen Dispute over Cyprus (Turks & Greeks in 1964) Conflict between Philippines and Malaysia over Sarawak and North Borneo Indo-Kashmir conflict Ending the Congo conflict Evaluation Played a quieter role than his two predecessors and was less controversial, largely due to the Great Powers preferred to delegate tasks to him, but did not want him to exercise leadership. U Thant was largely ineffective when it came to dealing with conflicts of interest to the superpowers, e.g. inability to resolve the Vietnam War despite putting in much effort. (his attempts e.g. a 3-stage proposal to restore order to Vietnam in Paris Peace Talks in 1968 to intervene in the Vietnam War were almost completely ignored by the USA and almost never brought up at GA or SC) icedvovos Page 2 1/12/12 o Was criticized for withdrawing UNEF forces before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; was questioned in his efficiency in dealing with the refugee crisis caused by the 1971 Bangladesh War. Also involved in sticky situations like the civil war in Nigeria in (which was delicate as the issue was not avidly discussed at GA or SC out of deference to the African nations) and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (U Thant led 10 members in the SC in condemning Soviet action, but was vetoed by the USSR). 4) KURT WALDHEIM ( , Austrian) Suspected war criminal based on his forced involvement with the Nazis, but later deemed innocent. Generally kept a low profile and was less inclined than his predecessors to offend the major powers. Term was plagued with much anti-israeli sentiment and his Nazi background won him much skepticism. UN mounted only 3 new peacekeeping missions while he was SG: 2 from the 1973 Yom Kippur War which were largely Kissinger creations (a Soviet-American resolution presented to the SC and accepted, producing UNEF 2; and the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria). The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (after Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978) also arose from US diplomacy was obviously ineffective Key events: Mediated conflicts in Cyprus, between India and Pakistan and in Southern Africa (Namibia) Evaluation Was described once as a headwaiter, serving the interests of the major powers. While he did have a number of successes, these were regarding small conflicts that were outside the interests of the major powers. His diplomatic efforts, particularly in the Middle East, were overshadowed by the diplomacy of the then-us Secretary of State, Kissinger. o Waldheim s efforts to mediate in the Vietnam War were unsuccessful due to the superpowers refusal to cooperate. o Efforts to deal with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were futile due to Cold War tensions o Was unable to prevent the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War (1973), and could not enforce Resolution 242 as the USA vetoed each time he tried o In 1980, flew to Iran in an attempt to negotiate the release of the US hostages held in Tehran, but Ayatollah Khomeini refused to see him o His critical comments about US bombing of North Vietnam resulted in a public denouncement by President Nixon. 5) JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR ( , Peruvian) Key events Enjoyed considerable success in resolving long-standing problems in Namibia, Western Sahara between Morocco and Polisario Front, Cyprus, South Africa and Nicaragua icedvovos Page 3 1/12/12 Brought an end to the Iran-Iraq war, the Cambodian war and the war in El- Salvador. Oversaw the UN s intervention in the Gulf War, often hailed as one of the UN s greatest successes in the aspect of peacekeeping. Evaluation The end of the Cold War marked a rise in prominence of the Secretary-General s political role, seen in the number of successful mediations and resolutions of conflict Cuellar presided over. Critics however claim his successes were borne from the favourable circumstances brought about by the end of the Cold War due to greater cooperation among the superpowers and P5. o As such, how large a role the SG could play was still very much dependent on the permission of the major powers? 6) BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI ( , Egyptian) Inherited the morning-after hangover from that false renaissance and the difficult problems of policing the tumult of the post-cold War world Hangover included a whole host of political problems including regional conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and Yugoslavia; one of the hardest tasks was dealing with the crisis of the Yugoslav Wars after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia Was vilified by the Arabs as the architect of the 1979 Camp David peace treaty, the academic engineer of Arab surrender Was very independent (mistrustful; did not attempt to have close relations with various ambassadors) and was a poor public communicator was not savvy with the press, particularly with US journalists o As a contrast to Cuellar, refused to attend closed-door consultations of the SC as a way of establishing independence Was primarily interested in peacekeeping and peace enforcement o In 1992, presented The Agenda for Peace: preventative deployment of troops to an area of potential crisis; agreements with governments to set aside special troops for possible rapid deployment by the UN; use of peaceenforcement troops (more heavily armed than peacemakers) for dangerous military missions like forcible maintenance of ceasefire o He was of the opinion that effective peacekeeping missions entailed the commitment of the Great Powers. He berated UN members for failing to provide troops when needed, and castigated the SC for trying to micromanage peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations o Boutros-Ghali liked to describe himself as the servant of the Security Council and often proclaimed his political weaknesses. Yet he did not see himself as a pure administrator; he saw himself as the catalyst and executor of decisions Was not re-elected for a second term despite African nations support due to US opposition and accusations of fund mismanagement/overbudgeting on frivolous pursuits (UNESCO) icedvovos Page 4 1/12/12 o Was very unpopular with the US e.g. the Clinton administration succeeded in deluding the US public into believing that it was Boutros Ghali alone who led US soldiers to disaster in Somalia Key events Played a major role in the Camp David breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict; managed to negotiate ceasefires in Slovenia and Croatia where the European Community failed Evaluation Was criticized for being both too activist and too passive. Effectiveness in resolving conflict was severely hampered by a multitude of limitations, such as the proliferation of political conflicts, high costs of conflict resolution and limited resources of the UN (lack of a central UN military force, and thus costs involved in creating a peacekeeping force for each operation) 7) Kofi Annan ( , Ghanaian) Accused of blocking proactive measures and logistical support in protecting the Tutsis and preventing the Rwandan genocide Called for overhauling the UN (UN Reform Plan), particularly the SC, to make it more representative of the UN s membership and to increase the organisation s effectiveness, but was not able to get member nations to agree to significant changes in the UN s structure Key Events In 1997, formulated the Kyoto Protocol but was criticized for being too passive in his attempts to get countries to ratify the treaty. In 1998, helped to ease the transition to civilian rule in Nigeria. In 1998, visited Iraq in an effort to resolve an impasse between Iran and the SC over compliance with resolutions involving weapons inspections and other matters, which helped avoid an outbreak of imminent hostilities. Was largely unsuccessful but won the respect of the SC and Saddam Hussein. In 1999, was deeply involved in the process by which Timor-Leste gained independence from Indonesia In 1999, endorsed NATO s bombing of Yugoslavia, but criticized for working too close with the USA and ignoring the SC s legitimacy In 2000, certified Israel s withdrawal from Lebanon Evaluation Particularly emphasized the UN s traditional obligations in the area of human rights and the newer challenges of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and international terrorism. Critics argue Annan s main achievement lay in the social aspects of the UN and did not do much to quell or solve political disputes in the international scene. icedvovos Page 5 1/12/12 GA DEVELOPMENTS 1) Rise in power ( ) Membership expansion: the GA became the main instrument of world pressure in favour of the emancipation of colonized people. The GA adopted resolution 1514, which legitimized all anti-colonial struggles and provided legal and psychological support to national liberation movements. Increase in authority and influence: GA s role was strengthened due to the involvement of Cold War politics in the SC, which perpetually frustrated decision-making in the UN by the free use of the veto. o The GA s power reached its height in 1950 during the Korean War resulting in the Uniting for Peace Resolution, enabling a special assembly to hold an emergency special session to be called at any time when there was deadlock in the SC. The Assembly was authorized to recommend if necessary the use of force. o Represented a transfer of power to the GA/ subversion of power since it rendered the veto useless. o Before the 1960s (at the time it was proposed), most of the GA members took a pro-usa stance thus the Uniting for Peace Resolution was often criticized as a tool by the USA to control and dominate the GA. o However, by the 2) Stagnation ( ) Decline of the GA: This was due to opposition from the USSR and France, which refused to fund peacekeeping operations authorized by the GA. Moreover, with the backdrop of detente, the USSR exercised its use of the veto far more infrequently in the SC, signaling a revival of the role of the SC and reducing the need for the GA to step in. Changing composition: With the rise of the Afro-Asian bloc, the majority of the GA was now anti-usa. The US was no longer able to command the majority of votes, and hence reverted to the SC. 3) Marginalisation and revival ( ) Marginalisation: The US hostility towards the GA was apparent in the mid-1980s when the Reagan administration relayed the US government s displeasure by accusing the GA of being anti-american and anti-israel. o The GA was accused of not condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supporting the national terrorist movements supported by the Arab league and USSR. o In 1985, the US Congress passed the Kassebaum Solomon Agreements which was a direct attack on the GA, demanding that states which contributed the most financially to the UN should be given more voting rights in the GA. Revival: Growing emphasis on development problems, including questions on human rights which led to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on Genocide, etc. icedvovos Page 6 1/12/12 SC DEVELOPMENTS 1) Largely ineffective ( ) Cold War politics caused stalemates o Discussions of the SC made public, placing great pressure on both superpowers to not be too compromising lest they face criticism at home 2) Greater effectiveness ( ) Easing of East-West tensions between the two superpowers during the period of detente, thus facilitating greater cooperation in the SC Increase in the size of the SC from 11 to 15 in 1963 to ensure a fair geographical representation thus non-permanent members grew to two-thirds of council membership, making it more difficult for permanent members to impose their will 3) Ineffective (1980s) Dominance of the Third World seen to be openly hostile to the USA Revival of Cold War tensions 4) Greater effectiveness ( ) End of the Cold War IMPORTANT TIME PERIODS 1960s: Period of worsening Cold War tensions o SC s atmosphere became distinctly theatrical; the most histrionic ambassadors were perceived to be doing the best jobs 1970s: Period of detente 3 rd world domination o West could no longer make the General Assembly do their bidding; US viewed the UN as the Third World s soap box Period of detente o UN was increasingly bypassed by the superpowers who were starting to deal directly with each other; UN was simply rubberstamping agreements and sending troops o Architect of detente on the US side was Kissinger, who was fairly disdainful about the UN 1980s: The Second Cold War o Virtually no role for the UN; in the decade after 1978, there were no UN peacekeeping missions at all o SC was so impotent that most countries in conflict no longer bothered to take their troubles there; resolutions, even when passed, were increasingly defied o Western states constructed forces to help achieve primarily western interests Effects of end of the Cold War a) Created a much better environment for peacekeeping b) Active participation of the superpowers in peacekeeping missions icedvovos Page 7 1/12/12 - Also removed constraints e.g. UN involvement not permitted in spheres of influence e.g. Hungary c) Increases a demand for peacekeeping d) USSR presented itself as international good citizen - E.g. paid off debts to the UN e) More positive US attitude under Bush (compared to Reagan, who was hostile to the UN) SIGNIFICANT CONFLICTS FIRST ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (1948) Trygve Lie greatly resented the US outright reversal in position (UN trusteeship of Palestine, as opposed to partition idea) Marked the last time Israel ever felt reasonably happy about the UN UNTSO: genuine international character (participation of many countries); became the longest continuous UN peacekeeping operation 1956 SUEZ CRISIS UNTSO was pathetically weak UK and France wanted to use the UN as a world forum to expose Nasser s intransigence; going with the UN was only to better disguise their intention for armed intervention Even after ostensibly pursuing a solution via the UN, UK and France proceeded anyway in their military intervention Both the USSR and US condemned France and UK (proving Cold War was not always dominant influence in UN); used Uniting for Peace procedure against them Hammarskjold asked for vote of confidence in the SC Israel made no effort to facilitate UNEF s task (possibly even deepened hostility); UNEF remained until 1967 UNEF was often regarded as a model of UN peacekeeping: temporary; noncoercive; limited brief; no aggressor identified (not collective security) SG s reputation enhanced Compared to the Hungarian Revolution, UN could not stop aggression USSR was implacably indifferent to UN condemnation SIX-DAY WAR (1967) U Thant completely withdrew troops o The Hammarskjold memorandum (managed to limit Nasser s authority to expel UN troops in 1956, in what became known as the good faith clause the Egyptians could not ask the UN to withdraw before the completion of the tasks icedvovos Page 8 1/12/12 set down by the resolution) was persuasive evidence that U Thant should have hesitated before embracing Egyptian authority whole. o He also erred on a second count by withdrawing all troops permanently even if Nasser allegedly only demanded a partial withdrawal; he also did not exercise his right to call an emergency meeting of the SC or GA to consider the issue o The UN may be faulted for not lifting the blockade even with US pressure U Thant did make attempts to ease tensions, e.g. flying to Cairo after Egypt had carried out the blockade to ask that they lift it for two weeks, and Israel to halt its use of the Gulf of Aqaba for two weeks to allow time for negotiations YOM KIPPUR WAR (1973) UNEF II formed at the behest of the two superpowers (direct talks between Gromyko and Kissinger; the UN was simply a vehicle to rubberstamp an established US- Soviet agreement) USSR sent military observers to UNTSO (new attitude towards peacekeeping generated by detente); Poland also formed part of UNEF II (softening of the neutralist principle). USSR also accepted that UNEF II could be treated as a regular expense of the organization and its costs could be levied on all members LEBANON (1978 AND 1982) In 1978, UNIFIL was established at the twilight of detente (UNIFIL had no robust mandate) and was largely ineffective; as such Israel invaded again in 1982 Difficulties UNIFIL faced: o Israel s default posture of instinctive hostility to peacekeeping (only temporarily suspended in respect of UNEF II and UNDOF). Israel installed the Christian Phalangist militias who became a rival focus of power to the UN as a more effective defence than the long-suspect UN against Palestinian incursions along the border. o To restore peace and security would require the force to confront both Palestinian and Phalangist forces who were, with or without an Israeli presence, intent on destroying each other. o Did not have freedom or movement; Palestinian refused to withdraw from a number of their own positions within the UN s supposed area of command Since UNIFIL was useless, the US created the Multinational Force (MNF), but that also proved a complete failure THE CONGO CRISIS ( ) UN Force: ONUC Hammarskjold for the first time invoked Article 99 which permitted him to presenting matters
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